Identifying Preferences for Conditional Cooperation Using Individual Beliefs

DOI10.1080/03610926.2010.491588zbMath1284.91152OpenAlexW2094201240MaRDI QIDQ3100636

M. Vittoria Levati, Luis G. González, Graciela M. González-Farías

Publication date: 18 November 2011

Published in: Communications in Statistics - Theory and Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/03610926.2010.491588

zbMATH Keywords

conditional cooperationquantal response equilibriumfinite mixturelatent class logit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
• Random usc functions, max-stable processes and continuous choice
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Social influence in the sequential dictator game
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
• Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Finite Mixture Distributions, Sequential Likelihood and the EM Algorithm
• Measuring Expectations
• Behavior in a Dynamic Decision Problem: An Analysis of Experimental Evidence Using a Bayesian Type Classification Algorithm
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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