Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3101771
DOI10.1126/science.1183665zbMath1226.91014OpenAlexW1985340978WikidataQ34112945 ScholiaQ34112945MaRDI QIDQ3101771
Herbert Gintis, Robert W. Boyd, Samuel Bowles
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1183665
Related Items (49)
Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism ⋮ Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment ⋮ Statistical physics of human cooperation ⋮ Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment ⋮ Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations ⋮ Collective Games on Hypergraphs ⋮ Cooperation, conformity, and the coevolutionary problem of trait associations ⋮ The institution as a blunt instrument: cooperation through imperfect observability ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations ⋮ Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution ⋮ The role of alliance cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Small world can alleviate the social dilemmas originating from self-regulation or community policing issues ⋮ Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games ⋮ Consensus towards partially cooperative strategies in self-regulated evolutionary games on networks ⋮ Identification and control of game-based epidemic models ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with stochastic opting-out ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging ⋮ In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments ⋮ Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game ⋮ Evolutionary games and applications: fifty years of `the logic of animal conflict' ⋮ The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas ⋮ When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game ⋮ Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory ⋮ The coevolution of culture and environment ⋮ Matthew effect of the random drift on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks ⋮ Social) Norm Dynamics ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Conditional punishment ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in the multigame on a two-layer square network ⋮ Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation ⋮ From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma ⋮ Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action ⋮ Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility ⋮ Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games ⋮ Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm ⋮ Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game ⋮ Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games ⋮ Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation ⋮ Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism: an experimental investigation
This page was built for publication: Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
