Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10zbMath1422.91299OpenAlexW1499076697MaRDI QIDQ3102584

George Pierrakos, Constantinos Daskalakis

Publication date: 5 December 2011

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition ⋮ Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets ⋮ A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions ⋮ Prediction and welfare in ad auctions

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