Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1100.1202zbMath1232.91412OpenAlexW2027740734MaRDI QIDQ3117312

Jun Yang

Publication date: 27 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1202

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentivesoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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