Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1070.0806zbMath1232.91296OpenAlexW2060469632MaRDI QIDQ3117707

Elena Katok, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date: 29 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/603f6f8a2d97394cae68d05e65f050c6d8a46b2b

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsexperimental economicscompetitive biddingregret learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (15)

Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Regret in auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ ON VARIABILITY OF SERIES AND PARALLEL SYSTEMS WITH HETEROGENEOUS COMPONENTS ⋮ Does regret matter in first-price auctions? ⋮ Inventory control and pricing for regret-averse newsvendor ⋮ Regret theory: a new foundation ⋮ Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Fear of losing in a clock auction ⋮ Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information ⋮ An equilibrium model of the supply chain network under multi-attribute behaviors analysis ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback ⋮ Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability ⋮ The impacts of retailers' regret aversion on a random multi-period supply chain network

This page was built for publication: Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions