An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.3982/TE760zbMath1242.91018OpenAlexW1575204797MaRDI QIDQ3119037

Marcin Pęski

Publication date: 7 March 2012

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te760

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesprivate monitoringanti-folk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria

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