Weakest-link attacker-defender games with multiple attack technologies

DOI10.1002/nav.21500zbMath1407.91071OpenAlexW2087890884MaRDI QIDQ3120573

Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Daniel G. Arce

Publication date: 5 March 2019

Published in: Naval Research Logistics (NRL) (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles/101

zbMATH Keywords

conflictColonel Blotto gameweakest linksuicide terrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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