Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

DOI10.1002/nav.21521zbMath1407.91147OpenAlexW3122533662MaRDI QIDQ3120587

Izak Duenyas, Qing Ye, Roman Kapuscinski

Publication date: 5 March 2019

Published in: Naval Research Logistics (NRL) (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96261

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryinformation asymmetryCournot gamecapacity managementvolume competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

The Incentive Study in the Blockchain Era: A Two-Period Strategic Inventory Game ⋮ Price competition with capacity uncertainty -- feasting on leftovers

This page was built for publication: Should competing firms reveal their capacity?