scientific article

zbMath0869.90013MaRDI QIDQ3125274

William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 18 March 1997

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

zbMATH Keywords

probabilityCondorcet winnervoting procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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