Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions

DOI10.1137/16M1072218zbMath1407.91125arXiv1404.2329OpenAlexW2785166043MaRDI QIDQ3133819

Elias Koutsoupias, Yiannis Giannakopoulos

Publication date: 6 February 2018

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2329

zbMATH Keywords

dualitymechanism designrevenue maximizationoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Optimality conditions and duality in mathematical programming (90C46) Linear programming (90C05) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis ⋮ Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions ⋮ Selling two goods optimally ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents ⋮ A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders ⋮ Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions

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