Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder

DOI10.2307/2298132zbMath0782.90015OpenAlexW2091948595MaRDI QIDQ3141211

Peter M. DeMarzo

Publication date: 28 February 1994

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a6f26d195fdad9aa16a165e1ce96ba15a1172747

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumincomplete marketsproduction economiescorporate controlmajority rule equilibriumvoting by shareholders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Voting theory (91B12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (14)

Constrained efficiency versus unanimity in incomplete markets ⋮ Production externalities: internalization by voting ⋮ Production in incomplete markets: expectations matter for political stability ⋮ An extension of the Modigliani-Miller theorem to stochastic economies with incomplete markets and interdependent securities ⋮ A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems ⋮ A bargaining theory of the firm ⋮ Shareholder voting ⋮ A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market ⋮ Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition ⋮ Equilibrium pricing of commodity spot and forward under incomplete markets with implications on convenience yield ⋮ Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility ⋮ Corporate financial hedging with proprietary information ⋮ The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm ⋮ Shareholders' choice

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