Cooperation when some players are incompatible

DOI10.1007/BF01414214zbMath0794.90081OpenAlexW1993804165MaRDI QIDQ3142159

Francesc Carreras, Gustavo Bergantiños, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

Publication date: 8 December 1993

Published in: ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01414214

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuebargainingsimple gamestransferable utilitycooperation structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players ⋮ Games and cooperation indices ⋮ The effects of excluding coalitions ⋮ Cooperation indices and coalitional value ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure ⋮ Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies ⋮ A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

Cites Work

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• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Restriction of simple games
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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