Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes

DOI10.1007/BF01414216zbMath0791.90008OpenAlexW2034827759MaRDI QIDQ3142161

Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters, Hans van der Stel

Publication date: 8 December 1993

Published in: ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01414216

zbMATH Keywords

continuityPareto optimalitysurjectivitystrategy-proofnessvoting schemesrange convexitycoordinatewise median voting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions

Cites Work

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• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters

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