Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
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Publication:3142516
DOI10.2307/2951491zbMath0794.90083OpenAlexW2107031016WikidataQ110829581 ScholiaQ110829581MaRDI QIDQ3142516
Hans Carlsson, Eric E. C. van Damme
Publication date: 31 August 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4122247000000001088.pdf
incomplete informationrisk dominancepayoff uncertaintyglobal gamenoisy observationincomplete information game
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