Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships

DOI10.2307/2951762zbMath0784.90026OpenAlexW2076269773MaRDI QIDQ3142740

Paul Beaudry, Michel Poitevin

Publication date: 20 December 1993

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951762

zbMATH Keywords

contractsinformed principalrenegotiationone-shot signalling game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements ⋮ On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships ⋮ Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers ⋮ Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information

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