TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CAN ISSUE LINKAGE HELP MITIGATE EXTERNALITIES?

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500028zbMath1253.91040MaRDI QIDQ3144193

Ariel Dinar, Kim Hang Pham Do, Daene C. McKinney

Publication date: 7 December 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

convexitygames with externalitiesissue linkageinternational water sharing agreements-coretransboundary rivers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Regional collaborative electricity consumption management: an urban operations research model

Cites Work

• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
• Sharing a river.
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

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