USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500041zbMath1260.91010MaRDI QIDQ3144195

Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez

Publication date: 7 December 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

aspiration corenonempty core extensionstrategic coalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Multicoalitional solutions ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Supermodular NTU-games ⋮ Autonomous coalitions

Cites Work

• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
• Multilateral bargaining problems
• The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME

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