Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
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Publication:314433
DOI10.1007/s10472-015-9491-5zbMath1410.91353OpenAlexW2239567346MaRDI QIDQ314433
Tamás Fleiner, Péter Biró, Robert W. Irving
Publication date: 16 September 2016
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/33935/1/BFI16amai_last.pdf
Related Items (5)
On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare ⋮ Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games ⋮ On the complexity of stable fractional hypergraph matching
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