Modeling costly learning and counter-learning in a defender-attacker game with private defender information
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Publication:314785
DOI10.1007/S10479-014-1722-3zbMath1345.91064OpenAlexW2168868668MaRDI QIDQ314785
Publication date: 16 September 2016
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1722-3
game theorycostly learningcounter-learningdefender-attacker gamesvalue of imperfect informationvalue of perfect information
Applications of game theory (91A80) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
Related Items (6)
A game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes ⋮ Two-stage security screening strategies in the face of strategic applicants, congestions and screening errors ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis under partial information ⋮ Espionage and the optimal standard of the customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT) program in maritime security ⋮ Sequential Shortest Path Interdiction with Incomplete Information ⋮ Sequential Shortest Path Interdiction with Incomplete Information and Limited Feedback
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