An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility

DOI10.1134/S0005117916050131zbMath1346.93285MaRDI QIDQ315169

N. A. Korgin, V. O. Korepanov

Publication date: 19 September 2016

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Application models in control theory (93C95) Decentralized systems (93A14)

Related Items (3)

A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Experimental Gaming Comparison of Resource Allocation Rules in Case of Transferable Utilities

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations

This page was built for publication: An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility