A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
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Publication:3153675
DOI10.1142/S0219198902000525zbMath1017.91009MaRDI QIDQ3153675
Gerhard Sorger, Josef Hofbauer
Publication date: 28 November 2002
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
- Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
- Potential games
- An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
