On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets

DOI10.1007/s00224-015-9634-4zbMath1346.91096arXiv1309.6474OpenAlexW1936473545MaRDI QIDQ315522

Evangelos Markakis, Ioannis Giotis, Josep Diaz, Lefteris M. Kirousis, Maria J. Serna

Publication date: 21 September 2016

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, LATIN 2014: Theoretical Informatics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.6474

zbMATH Keywords

auctionskeyword auctionssecond pricesponsored search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
• Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope
• Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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