Kidney Exchange
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Publication:3159691
DOI10.1162/0033553041382157zbMath1064.92029OpenAlexW4242907262WikidataQ56564684 ScholiaQ56564684MaRDI QIDQ3159691
Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2580565
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