Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1590zbMath1197.91128OpenAlexW2074687764MaRDI QIDQ3161801

Xiangkang Yin, Suren Basov

Publication date: 18 October 2010

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1590

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelrisk aversioncommon agencyrandom participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Manpower systems in sociology (91D35)

Related Items (2)

Two-part tariffs set by a risk-averse monopolist ⋮ On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening

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