The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1613zbMath1200.91130OpenAlexW2074517835MaRDI QIDQ3161808

Zhewei Wang

Publication date: 18 October 2010

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1613

zbMATH Keywords

contest success functionimperfectly discriminating contestheterogeneous abilitiesoptimal accuracy level

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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