Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1648zbMath1200.91118OpenAlexW2107927929WikidataQ60488706 ScholiaQ60488706MaRDI QIDQ3161816

Mark Braverman, Itai Ashlagi, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 18 October 2010

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64459

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintsposition auctionsex-post implementationPareto-efficiencyenvy-free allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (13)

On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets ⋮ Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets ⋮ A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions ⋮ Multi-unit auctions with budget limits ⋮ A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints ⋮ Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities ⋮ The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings

Cites Work

• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders

This page was built for publication: Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness