Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1638zbMath1200.91192OpenAlexW2061984898MaRDI QIDQ3161822

Bernardita Vial

Publication date: 18 October 2010

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1638

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationreputationperfect competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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