On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1629zbMath1200.91035OpenAlexW2024320421MaRDI QIDQ3161824

Alex Possajennikov

Publication date: 18 October 2010

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1629

zbMATH Keywords

indirect evolutiondelegationcontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

Cites Work

• What to maximize if you must
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

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