When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_1zbMath1253.91009OpenAlexW3137888307MaRDI QIDQ3162502

Christos H. Papadimitriou, Amos Fiat

Publication date: 19 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (14)

The complexity of equilibria for risk-modeling valuations ⋮ Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer ⋮ Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players ⋮ Complexity of rational and irrational Nash equilibria ⋮ Unit-sphere games ⋮ $$\mathcal {NP}$$-Hardness of Equilibria in Case of Risk-Averse Players ⋮ Minimizing expectation plus variance ⋮ Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents ⋮ The complexity of \((\mathsf{E}+\mathsf{Var})\)-equilibria, \(\mathsf{ESR}\)-equilibria, and \(\mathsf{SuperE}\)-equilibria for 2-players games with few cost values ⋮ Conditional value-at-risk: structure and complexity of equilibria ⋮ Lipschitz continuity and approximate equilibria ⋮ Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players ⋮ Risk-Averse Selfish Routing ⋮ Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria

Cites Work

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• Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games
• Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility
• Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine
• Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk

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