Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19zbMath1310.91062OpenAlexW3136472553MaRDI QIDQ3162520

Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind

Publication date: 19 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

How hard is safe bribery? ⋮ On the safety of group manipulation ⋮ Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting

Cites Work

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• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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