Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_21zbMath1310.91071arXiv1007.3539OpenAlexW3123827191MaRDI QIDQ3162522

Lei Wang, Gagan Goel, C. Karande

Publication date: 19 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.3539

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations ⋮ Price of fairness for allocating a bounded resource ⋮ Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design ⋮ On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments

Cites Work

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