On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_22zbMath1310.91073OpenAlexW3138170179MaRDI QIDQ3162524

Adrian Vetta, Volodymyr Kuleshov

Publication date: 19 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_22

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency
• Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Unnamed Item

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