No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand
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Publication:3162528
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_26zbMath1310.91095OpenAlexW3139232201MaRDI QIDQ3162528
Publication date: 19 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_26
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Uses Software
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