On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_29zbMath1310.91020OpenAlexW3137890761MaRDI QIDQ3162531

Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date: 19 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/16956

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (5)

Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property ⋮ Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands ⋮ Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games ⋮ Bottleneck routing with elastic demands ⋮ The strong price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games

Cites Work

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• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
• Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow

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