Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_30zbMath1310.91024OpenAlexW3137165448MaRDI QIDQ3162532

Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date: 19 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_30

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

Characteristic function games with restricted agent interactions: core-stability and coalition structures ⋮ Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing ⋮ Proof systems and transformation games ⋮ Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning ⋮ Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: expressiveness, complexity and applications

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• On the ratio of optimal integral and fractional covers
• On the core of the minimum cost Steiner tree game in networks
• The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
• The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
• Minimum cost spanning tree games
• Cost allocation for a spanning tree
• Cost allocation for steiner trees
• Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
• Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games