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DOI10.3982/ECTA7706zbMath1252.91057MaRDI QIDQ3165270

Noah Williams

Publication date: 26 October 2012

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic controlprincipal-agent modelcontinuous timedynamic contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (25)

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