First-price winner-takes-all contests

DOI10.1080/02331934.2010.529138zbMath1252.91025OpenAlexW2087446518MaRDI QIDQ3165899

Julio González-Díaz

Publication date: 19 October 2012

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2010.529138

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscomplete informationlitigationBertrand competitionrent-seekingtiming gamestax competitionpolitical campaignsperfect discriminationfirst pricewinner-takes-all contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Games of timing (91A55)

Related Items (2)

First-price winner-takes-all contests ⋮ Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs

Cites Work

• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• A silent battle over a cake
• It takes two to tango: equilibria in a model of sales
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
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• Tax evasion, tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Price Competition between Market Makers
• First-price winner-takes-all contests
• All-Pay Contests
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• A silent duel over a cake

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