ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES

DOI10.1142/S021919891100299XzbMath1259.91007OpenAlexW2050861174MaRDI QIDQ3166236

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100299x

zbMATH Keywords

strategic stabilitytrembling-hand perfect equilibriumweakly dominated strategydiscontinuous normal-form gamelimit admissible equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games

Cites Work

• On strategic stability in discontinuous games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
• The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
• Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games

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