COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

DOI10.1142/S021919891100309XzbMath1259.91037OpenAlexW2086056705MaRDI QIDQ3166249

Tanga M. McDaniel

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100309x

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsincomplete informationcoordinationcheap talkrisk dominancepayoff dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games

Cites Work

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• Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria

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