Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_44zbMath1367.91077arXiv1205.3077OpenAlexW2144285067MaRDI QIDQ3167037

Yaron Singer, Ilias Diakonikolas, George Pierrakos, Christos H. Papadimitriou

Publication date: 1 November 2012

Published in: Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.3077

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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Auction Design with a Revenue Target ⋮ Welfare-preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC transformation with negligible revenue loss ⋮ General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets ⋮ Prediction and welfare in ad auctions ⋮ Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders

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