Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources

DOI10.1002/nav.20360zbMath1210.90116OpenAlexW2093062000MaRDI QIDQ3168962

Morton John Canty, Ruldolf Avenhaus

Publication date: 27 April 2011

Published in: Naval Research Logistics (NRL) (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.20360

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryinspection gamescritical timesnonproliferation treaty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

Related Items (3)

Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game ⋮ Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game ⋮ Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners

Cites Work

• Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections
• Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort
• Timely inspection and deterrence

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