Subgame Perfection in Positive Recursive Games with Perfect Information

DOI10.1287/moor.1090.0437zbMath1232.91036OpenAlexW2141332087MaRDI QIDQ3169089

Jeroen Kuipers, Janos Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers

Publication date: 27 April 2011

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/58586a9a-6353-439a-a984-77783b1d8169

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamesrecursive gamesperfect information gamessubgame-perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (14)

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state ⋮ The Condorcet paradox revisited ⋮ Costless delay in negotiations ⋮ On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games ⋮ Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games ⋮ On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of the deterministic \(n\)-person games with perfect information and mean or total effective cost ⋮ Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies ⋮ Stochastic games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games ⋮ Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium ⋮ Subgame-perfection in free transition games

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