Position Auctions with Consumer Search

DOI10.1093/qje/qjr028zbMath1222.91019OpenAlexW2133198311WikidataQ57568069 ScholiaQ57568069MaRDI QIDQ3173398

Susan Athey, Glenn Ellison

Publication date: 10 October 2011

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15253.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (14)

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms ⋮ Competitive search obfuscation ⋮ Generalized second price auctions over a network ⋮ Optimally integrating ad auction into e-commerce platforms ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids ⋮ Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions ⋮ Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ Personalized pricing and advertising: an asymmetric equilibrium analysis ⋮ Fairness and efficiency in online advertising mechanisms ⋮ Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search ⋮ Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction ⋮ Strategic games in a competitive market: feedback from the users' environment

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