On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games
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Publication:3177160
DOI10.1137/17M1139461zbMath1391.93020arXiv1707.06465OpenAlexW2787689390MaRDI QIDQ3177160
Soummya Kar, Brian Swenson, Ryan W. Murray
Publication date: 27 July 2018
Published in: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.06465
Noncooperative games (91A10) Stability of topological dynamical systems (37B25) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Decentralized systems (93A14) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Large-scale systems (93A15)
Related Items (9)
On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games ⋮ Continuous-Time Convergence Rates in Potential and Monotone Games ⋮ Exploration-exploitation in multi-agent learning: catastrophe theory meets game theory ⋮ Fictitious Play in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games ⋮ Profit sharing mechanisms in multi-owned cascaded hydrosystems ⋮ Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games ⋮ Affine Relaxations of the Best Response Algorithm: Global Convergence in Ratio-Bounded Games ⋮ Regular potential games ⋮ The lower convergence tendency of imitators compared to best responders
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