Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations

DOI10.1145/2786754zbMath1426.68119OpenAlexW2333413293MaRDI QIDQ3177762

Jan Vondrák, Shahar Dobzinski

Publication date: 2 August 2018

Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2786754

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitysubmodular functionstruthful mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness ⋮ Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding ⋮ Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding

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