Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding

DOI10.1145/2908735zbMath1407.91124OpenAlexW2521447776MaRDI QIDQ3177806

Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan

Publication date: 2 August 2018

Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2908735

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Tight Approximation Bounds for Maximum Multi-coverage ⋮ Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey ⋮ Item bidding for combinatorial public projects ⋮ Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round ⋮ Tight approximation bounds for maximum multi-coverage

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