Dynamics on Linear Influence Network Games Under Stochastic Environments

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_7zbMath1453.91036OpenAlexW2528906873MaRDI QIDQ3179195

Zhengyuan Zhou, Nicholas Bambos, Peter W. Glynn

Publication date: 21 December 2016

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_7

zbMATH Keywords

game theorynetworkssecuritystochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15)

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