Standard Security Does Not Imply Indistinguishability Under Selective Opening

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_5zbMath1397.94072OpenAlexW2402377178MaRDI QIDQ3181024

Daniel Wichs, Dennis Hofheinz, Vanishree Rao

Publication date: 22 December 2016

Published in: Theory of Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (19)

The Usefulness of Sparsifiable Inputs: How to Avoid Subexponential iO ⋮ SO-CCA secure PKE from pairing based all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions ⋮ Targeted lossy functions and applications ⋮ Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation ⋮ Public-Key Encryption with Simulation-Based Selective-Opening Security and Compact Ciphertexts ⋮ Tightness subtleties for multi-user PKE notions ⋮ On the gold standard for security of universal steganography ⋮ Selective Opening Security from Simulatable Data Encapsulation ⋮ Selective-Opening Security in the Presence of Randomness Failures ⋮ Let attackers program ideal models: modularity and composability for adaptive compromise ⋮ Simulation-based bi-selective opening security for public key encryption ⋮ Post-quantum insecurity from LWE ⋮ Possibility and impossibility results for receiver selective opening secure PKE in the multi-challenge setting ⋮ Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting ⋮ Constructions Secure Against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks ⋮ Practical public key encryption with selective opening security for receivers ⋮ Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions ⋮ On selective-opening security of deterministic primitives ⋮ IBE with tight security against selective opening and chosen-ciphertext attacks

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