CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS

DOI10.1017/S1365100507050420zbMath1170.91471OpenAlexW3124668024MaRDI QIDQ3182105

Gianluca Femminis

Publication date: 4 October 2009

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100507050420

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric InformationCurrency AttacksFixed Exchange RateGlobal GamesMultiple Equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Ruling Out Multiplicity and Indeterminacy: The Role of Heterogeneity
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

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