Escaping expectation traps: how much commitment is required?

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2012.10.009zbMath1346.91159OpenAlexW2090117587MaRDI QIDQ318384

Christoph Himmels, Tatiana Kirsanova

Publication date: 5 October 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriacommitmentlimited commitmentdiscretionmonetary and fiscal policy interactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Dynamics of fiscal financing in the United States
• Fiscal policy under loose commitment
• Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices.
• Existence and uniqueness of unmixed solutions of the discrete-time algebraic Riccati equation
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
• The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations
• Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy
• Quick Job Entry or Long-TermHuman Capital Development? The Dynamic Effects of Alternative Training Schemes
• Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria

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